A Letter to Those who would Abrogate the RIGHT TO TRAVEL. P - A Letter to Those who would Abrogate the RIGHT TO TRAVEL. PART III Since the funding received by the DPSST is primarily from revenue generated from fines imposed in “trafficking” courts, it will be easy for those who would cast aspersions on y

Posted: Sun Jul 04, 2010 9:19 pm

A Letter to Those who would Abrogate the RIGHT TO
TRAVEL. PART I

Date: March 10, 2010

To: Custodian of Records for Department of Public
Safety Standards and Training, Through Director
Erick Gabliks

From: Richard L. Koenig, member of the general
public under ORS 801.305

In Re: Public Records Law Request for the
legislature's mandate to law enforcement officers to
enforce driver licensing, vehicle titling & registration
laws against the general public, IF ANY.

Dear Director Gabliks

I am investigating the source of the rumor positing
that all highway users have to possess a driver license or
privilege, which is granted, subject to compliance with
the motor vehicle laws of this state. Since Oregon
adopted the format known as the “Oregon Revised
Statutes” in 1953, the “Oregon Vehicle Code” has not
included a definition of any of the terms referring to the
regulated entities thereunder. All laws must give
adequate notice to those from whom compliance is
expected for obvious reasons. Without a definition of
“person”, “driver” or “operator”, a reader who is not
familiar with the definitions under General Laws of
Oregon 1925, Ch. 380, as amended by General Laws of
Oregon 1929, Ch. 394 (see Attorney General Isaac Van
Winkle's Opinion of Aug. 28, 1929), might be confused
about just who is regulated by the Vehicle Code.

Not only is the investigation getting closer to the
source of the rumor, but those who stand to profit from
the misperception engendered by the popular rumor are
also coming into focus. The technique of “Requesting
Public Records” under ORS 192.420 is being used in
order to create a legal presumption that certain
government bodies, or at least the personnel who infest
them, are knowledgeable of, and therefore complicit in,
wholesale violation of the public trust.

By requiring a public body to provide for the
inspection of a public record/authority that doesn't
exist, that would have to be in an agency's top right
hand drawer if it did, the legal presumption can be
imposed that reliance on the non-existent record as
justification for “official action”, is conclusive evidence
of bad faith. As various public bodies have failed to
produce ostensible records authorizing search, seizure
and fines imposed against the traveling public, and been
found wanting, the inquiry becomes more exciting.
Right now you and I are in control of what happens
next. But the tension builds around the question, how
big a problem, or maybe how much of a big problem,
has to be exposed before it becomes unavoidably
“public”, and then beyond control?

To give you a good idea of where we are now, as far
as “in control” goes, herewith is a modest selection of
responses I have been collecting. View the following
examples of disclosure against the backdrop of the
Oregon Evidence Code at Rule 311(c). The sweet thing
about this Rule of Evidence, is that failure to produce a
record when required under the public record law
means probable cause exists to believe that, in many
cases, a crime is being committed. It can not be a crime
to fail to send a non-existent record, but if an agency is
basing its official duty on laws that have never been
enacted, to the detriment of the people to whom a duty
of service is owed, that's when a problem begins to looks
like organized crime.

In correspondence responsive to a demand for the
legislative enactment enlarging the subject class of the
motor vehicle laws, explicitly described as “operators
for hire” in the first sentence of General Laws of
Oregon 1911, Chapter 174, Legislative Counsel, Dexter
Johnson wrote: that enactment “probably doesn't exist
anywhere”. Mr. Johnson's response, addressed to yours
truly, is dated August 18, 2008.

As a result of a criminal proceeding in which I
entered a plea no contest to one count of “seeking
information from the state capitol” Judge Lynn
Ashcroft of the Marion County Circuit Court agreed to
write to recent past Chief Deputy Attorney General
Peter D. Shepherd to ask for the same law Mr. Johnson
said “probably doesn't exist anywhere”. Mr. Shepherd
responded to Judge Ashcroft's inquiry in a two page
opinion, confirming Mr. Johnson's best guess, with a statement on the
second page, “... the motor vehicle laws are irrelevant to
the general public..” (State v Koenig, Dec. '0 Cool

.

On October 19, 2009 ODOT Director Matthew
Garrett addressed a request for action to the Oregon
Transportation Commission to “deny the petition for the
proposed rule providing for the optional registration of
motor [sic] vehicles” that are owned by members of the
general public. Such proposed rule had been submitted
by yours truly and his State Representative, Jules Kopel Bailey. The proposed rule was submitted to implement DMV Director David P.
Moomaw's legislative package encoded in 1985 at ORS
803.035 through 803.040 and 803.310.

The rule adoption process entails filing certain
documents with the Secretary of State's Rules Unit,
including the STATEMENT OF NEED AND FISCAL
IMPACT, describing the financially impacted parties.
The financially impacted parties for purposes of
“Optional titling”are described as, “members of the
general public who choose to apply for [vehicle] title”.
Under the authorizing statutes at ORS 803.040, the
reader finds: “IF this state has issued title, the vehicle
shall remain titled and subject to all of the provisions of
the vehicle code until one of the following occurs:”.
The first inference to be drawn from this explicit
language is that none of the vehicles in Mr. Moomaw's
sections can become “subject to all of the provisions of
the vehicle code...” unless by an exercise of the owner's
will to “choose” vehicle titling and registration.

The language of the STATEMENT OF NEED AND
FISCAL IMPACT is precise and certain regarding the
identity of the “owner” who may “choose” to title (or
“request” is the word found in the authorizing statute).
Since the document does not include language excluding
certain vehicles subject to titling “upon request of an
owner”, it must be concluded that ANY and ALL
vehicles MAY be, as long as they are not owned or
operated by the regulated class. However, the reader
need not rely on mere presumptions inherent in proper
English grammar. The authorizing statute also
particularly lists “... categories of vehicles, types of
vehicles and otherwise...” as subject to optional titling.
Clearly, when the word “category” is made plural, the
author, Mr. Moomaw, or his judge and lawyer
associates on the Minor Court Rules Committee (former
ORS 1.510), meant two or more “categories” of vehicles.
Then there are “types of vehicles”. Again, the plural
form of the word means that there are two or more
groups of vehicles designated by the word “types”.
Even though Mr. Moomaw was talking about a lot of
vehicles that aren't required to be titled and registered
with his reference to categories and types of vehicles,
there are so many more, that are so diverse, that they
are simply referred to as “otherwise”.

In view of ORS 803.040(2)(c) referencing
vehicles that are “... NOT REQUIRED to be titled for
ANY reason”, it is simply FRIVOLOUS to assert that
all vehicles must be titled and subject to the Vehicle
Code.

Posted: Sun Jul 04, 2010 9:22 pm

A Letter to Those who would Abrogate the RIGHT TO
TRAVEL. PART II

WHAT VEHICLES ARE SUBJECT TO TITLING &
REGISTRATION?

The language of ORS 803.030(14)(c) and
803.305(14)(c) is EXPLICIT: “Except as otherwise
provided in this paragraph, a vehicle operated over the
highways of this state MUST comply with the titling
[and registration] requirement[s]...”. Is it necessary to
point out that the word “EXCEPT” means “AND NO
OTHERS”?

For additional clarity on the issue of vehicle
compliance, the “relating clauses” of several of the
Motor Vehicle Acts of the 1920s provide the reader
insight at a glance. However, I like to point to the Acts
referenced by Mr. Attorney General, Isaac Van Winkle in his
previously noted Opinion of August 28, 1929. Mr. Van
Winkle's Opinion relies on a Supreme Court decision
from Washington declaring that Hertz rental cars are
not the regulated “motor vehicle” . Oregon's Supreme
Court decision on vehicle registration is, Camas Stage
Co. Inc. v Kozer (104 Or 600).

Most, if not all, jurisdictions that hire law
enforcement officers have a college education
requirement. ORS 803.030(14)(c) & 803.305(14)(c) are
written, by law, so that a sixth grader can read and
understand them without having to resort to Attorney
General's Opinions and case law. Is it beyond the realm
of possibility to expect as much from a cop with a
college education?

Even though “persons” regulated by the Vehicle
Code are not defined thereunder, they are defined, and
tied into the Vehicle Code with specific language at:
ORS 174.100(5); 183.310( Cool

; 153.039. Just as
regulated “persons” are defined somewhere in the
Oregon Revised Statutes, so are the vehicles used by
regulated “persons” subject to the Vehicle Code.
“Commercial vehicle” is defined at ORS 801.210, and
“Commercial motor vehicle” is defined at ORS
801.208(1). Because these vehicles are defined in the
Vehicle Code, a statutory reader is given to understand
that they are proper subjects of regulation thereunder.
Please note the contrast between the vehicles in ORS
801.208(1) and 801.208(2). Those listed under (2) are
“NOT INCLUDED” in the definition of “Commercial
motor vehicle”. The “solely for personal use” vehicles in
(2)(e) are defined at ORS 446.003. This fact, alone,
gives a reader of statutes to understand that the class of
vehicles defined in ORS 446.003 CAN NOT be subject
to the provisions of the vehicle code, which is
encompassed by chapters 801 to 826.

All “motor vehicles” are “vehicles”, but not all
“vehicles” are “motor vehicles” (even if they are
“motorized”). “Vehicle” is defined at ORS 801.590 as
“... every device in, upon or by which persons or
property is, or may be drawn or transported upon the
highway...”. With no room for any doubt, there are two
sub groups comprising the defined “vehicle”. The first
group is denoted by the term “is”. “IS” means these
devices CURRENTLY ARE engaging in drawing or
transporting persons or property. The second group is
denoted by the term “may be”. “MAY BE” is explicit, it
means that the device is capable of being used to draw
or transport, but it is NOT CURRENTLY doing so.

To bring the fact of the matter into sharp contrast,
the statutory reader need only consult the few following
sections: ORS 801.305 defines “highway” as all places
open to public use of vehicles “as a matter of RIGHT”.
The operative definition of “RIGHT” is “without let or
hindrance” (see Kurtz v So. Pac. Co., 80 Or 218-219).
Please note that the general public DOES NOT
“operate” anything on the highways. The statutory
term for what they do with “vehicles” on the highway is
“USE”. Such “use”, in a previous definition of
“highway” at former ORS 482.010(5), was referred to
as “VEHICULAR TRAVEL”. However, in Kurtz, the
public “CONTROLS an automobile for pleasure, profit
or gain”.

ORS 806.010, closely paraphrased, says a person
who operates a motor vehicle on the highways open to
the public as a matter of right, better have proof of
insurance. Clearly, the subject of the legal constraint is
the “person who operates a motor vehicle”, rather than
the public for whom the highway is “open to vehicular
travel as a matter of right”.

ORS 807.010 is phrased in nearly identical terms to
806.010, but with reference to motor vehicle operators
needing to possess “an appropriate grant of driving
privilege”. The point to be taken here, is that any time
“the public” is referenced in the Vehicle Code, it is in
context with highways “open... as a matter of right” for
their vehicles, but “motor vehicle operators” MUST
COMPLY, pursuant to their licensing agreement with
ODOT/DMV (ORS 801.050).

All law enforcement officers swear, under penalty
of perjury, to support the constitutions. Honoring the
provisions of Article IV, Section 20 of the Oregon
Constitution PROHIBITING the Legislative Assembly
from enacting laws “embracing more than one subject”,
is certainly part of what officers swear they will do.
Since the provisions of Title 59 of Business Regulations
(Part 2) are specific to “persons who operate motor
vehicles”, and who better have a license to drive,
(“License, means... permission required by law to
pursue any commercial activity, trade, occupation or
profession. ORS 183.310(5)), the Vehicle Code CAN
NOT embrace a second subject, like “the general
public” who use vehicles “as a matter of RIGHT”.

Beyond the issue of vehicles, whether currently
transporting or not (“transportation” is defined in the
legislature's official guide to common English usage,
Webster's New International Dictionary, meaning
hauled for hire on a carrier), we, the people, have
constitutionally protected rights, like the pursuit of
happiness. We, the people, are not to be deprived of
such rights, except through “due process of law”
(Oregon Const. at Article I, Section 11). The right to
travel has long been held to be a constitutionally
protected, preexisting human right. One of Oregon's
Supreme Court decisions on the right to travel, that is
only mentioned here because it references several other
Supreme Court rulings from throughout the sister
states, is Cummings v Jones, (79 Or 276 – 280).

While on the subject of “rights”, all law
enforcement officers must be familiar with the first
clause of the first sentence at Article I, Section 1 of
Oregon's Constitution. This preeminent clause declares
“... that all men are equal in right...”. Simply picked
apart, the declaration means nothing more than: no
other man or group of men, or even a gender mixed
group, has a superior right, such that he, she, or they
have the power to infringe any right of other
Oregonians. The less literate among us might protest
that they elected legislators to rule over society and tell
us all what to do and how to live our lives. That silly
notion is definitively disposed of in the frequently cited
Oregon Supreme Court decision in the matter of Kalich
v Knapp (73 Or 558). Mr. Justice Charles McNary,
writing, said, “The will of the people is crystallized in
the acts of the legislature”. Mr. Knapp ran over Mr.
Kalich, a cop, who sued Mr. Knapp as though he might
have been a negligent “person” subject to the motor
vehicle laws. Mr. Kalich lost at the Circuit Court, the
Appeals Court and in the Supreme Court, twice.
Essentially, the Court ruled that drunk cops have to
exercise ordinary caution, when stumbling around on
the street, because the Constitution prohibits the
application of the police powers to “people” like Mr.
Knapp. ORS 181.030(3) places similar expectations on
all law enforcement personnel, whether they be Oregon
State Police, or officers who work for local and
municipal governments. At ORS 181.400 law
enforcement officers are PROHIBITED “from
interfering with personal or property rights” of anyone,
unless in the course of preventing crimes or arresting
someone who has already committed one. On the other
hand, in the exercise of the police powers of the state,
officers are specifically authorized to stop and cite “any
employee, agent, or representative of a firm, corporation
or other organization IF [,but only if,] the officer has
reasonable grounds to believe that the firm, corporation
or other organization has committed a VIOLATION”
(ORS 153.039).

All officers know the difference between criminal
law and regulatory law (the police powers). In order to
serve and protect the public, this distinction is one of the
fundamentals every officer learned from his or her
courses in constitutional studies that schools are
required to provide (ORS 336.057 & 336.067). Even
though definitions of the regulated “Persons”, “driver”,
and “operator”, have never appeared in the Vehicle
Code, “Person”, for purposes of the criminal, or “Penal
Code”, ONLY, is defined at ORS 161.015 is, “a human
being or where appropriate a corporation...”.

During the 2003 legislative session, just before
Senator John Minnis was appointed Director of the
DPSST, he, as Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, was the legislator who most recently worked
on amending the provisions of ORS 153.083. ORS
153.083 describes the “Role of the peace officer” in
traffic court. Under subsection (1) of that section,
officers are expected to be able to “... argue the
application of the statutes and rules to the facts of the
case”. The term “APPLICATION” leaves no doubt that
to some, the motor vehicle laws are “applicable”, but to
others they are not. Thus, an “argument” about
whether a given traffic court defendant is subject to the
motor vehicle laws, or not, would be first in the order of
business before an administrative hearings officer trying
a licensing agreement violation matter, and is therefore
properly designated as (1).

The role of the peace officer, and how officers are
taught to properly play that role is where you and yours
will contribute to the investigation of the rumor that
would have us believe that all highway users have to
possess a driver license. Since the Police Training
Academy, DPSST for that matter, derives its funding
primarily from traffic court revenue, it is of utmost
importance to your organization's financial welfare that
officers be adequately trained to enforce the trafficking
laws by citing proper “persons” and then successfully
arguing the “application of the statutes and rules to the
facts of the case”. I am absolutely certain that in a free
state, as opposed to a police state, that an organization
such as yours, receives its marching orders from the
people's delegated/elected law makers. When an officer
is properly trained to assure the peace, safety and
happiness of the traveling public, they will, without a
doubt, know who the “privileged” class of drivers are
they need to ride herd on. The DPSST Director's job
description says he is ultimately responsible for making
sure law enforcement officers know what they need to
know. Therefore, I am making the following request for
public records, through you, in order to get closer to the
source of the rumor.

I am particularly seeking any records that contain
reference to the rumor that “everybody has to have a
license” (see “Driver license” defined at ORS 801.245
and the term which “may be used interchangeably”
therewith, defined at ORS 183.310(5), also Classes of
Driver License at ORS 807.031). It goes without saying
that documents that are inconsistent, or appear to
contradict ORS 803.040(2)(c), “... the vehicle is NOT
REQUIRED to be TITLED for ANY reason”, and
therefore CAN NOT be compelled to compliance with
“... all of the provisions of the vehicle code...”, are also
objects of interest to this investigation. Inasmuch as this
request for records is made for the purpose of tracking
down the source of the rumor, to wit, everybody who
uses a vehicle on the highway better have a license,
please include any/all records indicating the source or
date of issuance of the records provided in response to
this request.

You, or your designated custodian of records shall
provide for inspection, the records conveyed to the
Department of Public Safety Standards and Training
that describe, define or otherwise make definite and
certain the identity of the regulated “person”, “driver”
or “operator” who is “subject to compliance with the
motor vehicles laws of this state”
(ORS 01.050).

You, or your designated custodian of records shall
provide for inspection, the records conveyed to the
Department of Public Safety Standards and Training
that describe, define or otherwise make definite and
certain the nature of a vehicle's “USE” that makes it “...
subject to all of the provisions of the vehicle code” (ORS
803.040(1)).

You, or your designated custodian of records shall
provide for inspection, the training material designed
and created to instruct law enforcement officers in
properly “arguing the application of the statutes and
rules to the facts of the case” pursuant to ORS
153.083(1).

In order to avoid the possibility of unnecessary
debate, please send NO statutes unless accompanied by
an interpretation signed by a rumor monger. If your
responsive submission is based on legislative activity,
ORS 174.530 provides guidance by stating that resort to
the Acts is definitive. If you find it necessary to rely on
an Act, or even case law, you need not bear the expense
of reproduction of such records. Merely use the
conventional method of citing either or both. Acts are
cited by year of enactment, Chapter of the session's
laws, and then section. The Motor Vehicle Law that
Mr. Johnson said hasn't been amended with regard to
the subject class is thus cited as, “General Laws of
Oregon 1911, Chapter 174, Section [such or another]”.
Judicial decisions are cited by Volume, then the court
“Or App” for the Appeals Court, “Or” for the Supreme
Court, and then generally the page number of the first
page, sometimes a particular page is sufficient,
sometimes a range of pages. The people's right to use
the highways as set forth in Cummings v Jones could be
accurately cited as, “79 Or 276 – 280”. The Oregon
Constitution, is cited by Article and Section, such as the
basic premise of the relationship the people have with
their government at “Article I, Section 1”, the Articles
being set off by Roman numerals.

Posted: Sun Jul 04, 2010 9:23 pm

A Letter to Those who would Abrogate the RIGHT TO
TRAVEL. PART III

Since the funding received by the DPSST is
primarily from revenue generated from fines imposed in
“trafficking” courts, it will be easy for those who would
cast aspersions on your organization to construe a
MOTIVE for it, or you, to misapply Oregon's Motor
Vehicle Laws. Therefore, in preparing your response
to this request, you should take care to avoid inserting
anything other than documents provided to the DPSST
for the purpose of training law enforcement officers.

Please be aware that with regard to claims you may
be tempted to assert that run counter to the publicly
accessible information set forth herein, you will be
expected to bear the burden of persuasion pursuant to
Oregon's Evidence Code, cited as OEC Rule 305 (also
see OEC Rule 311(c)).

Please check your records and find that in
anticipation of cost of reproduction of Public Records, I
tendered twenty seven dollars ($27) to the
DPSST for the training material empowering an
officer's argument of the application of the statutes and
rules to the facts of the case. While ten pages of
document were received, not one of them would have
been helpful to an officer attempting to make arguments
about the application of the statutes and rules to the
facts of the case. A request was made for refund OR
additional pages. I HAVE NOT received either. Since
that time, the scope of the investigation has been
adjusted to focus on catching those who are fostering a
misperception by spreading a rumor that can not
possibly be true. The misperception that is being
fostered is distinctly adverse to the best interests of the
public, stripping them of their right to come and go as
free people will, without due process of law, not to
mention their right to be left alone and to be free from
unwarranted seizure. Some of us are being killed.

Inasmuch as you have sworn to, among other
things, provide for the peace, safety and happiness of the
people, I am PETITIONING for a waiver of the half
dollar per page the DPSST charges for producing
documents. It is obviously in the best interest of the
people, to whom you owe a duty of service, to have the
rumor that everybody has to have a driver license
tracked to its source, and those who would profit from
the misperception fostered thereby, apprehended. I am
therefore not only asking for a waiver of fees for your
sworn duty, but a refund of the $27 that the suspect,
John Minnis, talked me out of previously.

These are the choices you are faced with in
responding:

You may choose to remain silent. The right of the
accused to avoid self incrimination is a traditional
American Right. If you choose to remain silent, in the
face of the law that requires the production of records,
you will establish by employment of legal presumptions
that you agree with Legislative Counsel Dexter Johnson,
former Chief Deputy Attorney General Peter D.
Shepherd, former DMV Director David P. Moomaw,
Mr. Attorney General Isaac Van Winkle, Mr. Justice
Charles McNary and our Legislative Assembly of 2007
(House Bill 3445 was also signed by Governor Ted
Kulongoski and Secretary of State Bill Bradbury) that
the people, or “the general public” and their “solely for
personal use” vehicles are NOT subject to the provisions
of Title 59, Business Regulations (Part 2). You will also
be stating that you, as the person with ultimate
responsibility for the education of law enforcement
officers, DO NOT have curriculum by which officers are
instructed as to their AUTHORIZED role under ORS
153.083(1) and DUTY
under the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 20 A,
when challenged in a traffic court venue.
The problem with choosing to remain silent is that
you will create the impression that while you know that
the people have rights, including to be secure in their
persons and property against unwarranted search and
seizure, you allow, condone and encourage the current
practice of law enforcement to interfere with their
rights, particularly their right to use the highway, as
encoded at ORS 801.305. Further, the legal
presumption will lie that you intend the consequences of
your allowing, condoning and encouraging because you
and your organization are financially better off as a
result.

You may choose to foster a cooperative relationship
with the people to whom you owe a fiduciary duty, by
stating that the DPSST will develop a
course of instruction on “the application of the statutes
and rules to the facts
of the case” by a particularly stated date, and until such
time as officers are duly instructed thereby, you, as the
Director, HAVE issued a statewide directive to all law
enforcement agencies to conform their regulatory
activities with the provisions of ORS 153.039 and ORS
181.400 (see ORS 174.020(2) and ORS 174.030).

By choosing to foster a cooperative relationship
with the people, and protect them against long standing
abuse of power, you may incur political fallout from
those who have willfully foisted the rumor on the public
that they must have permission granted by public
servants to use their own Public Right of Way.
However, since you are on top of the heap, so to speak,
with regard to the armed might of the combined police
agencies of Oregon, you should be well equipped to
handle a little static. When you engage in a high profile
public campaign against corruption in public office by
giving notice of return to the rule of law through
popular media outlets, you will engender unprecedented
public support. Your allegiance to the people will make
you a viable candidate for any public office you may
ever wish to occupy. You will deserve that support and
I will pledge you mine.

You may choose to advance the FRIVOLOUS
RUMOR that a law exists requiring everybody to have a
driver license and that every device with a motor in it is
subject to titling and registration, but that you intend to
withhold that law from those who need to know. You
may choose to say that the legislature, and the Oregon
State Bar Association that drafted the
provisions of “Role of the peace officer” at ORS
153.083, did not know what they were talking about or
enacting. You may choose to assert that the distinction
between the public's use of the highway as a matter of
right and the privilege of owners and operators has been
abolished by the force of arms borne by graduates of the
Police Training Academy. Therefore, there is no need
for your graduates “to argue the application of the
statutes and rules to the facts of the case” under ORS
153.083(1).

In the event that you choose this course, by
application of Rules 305 and 311(c) of the Oregon
Evidence Code, you will be effectively DECLARING
THAT PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS to believe that
more likely than not, you are engaging in and
encouraging others to engage in the felony offense of
Treason (ORS 166.005). The next two Police Training
Academy graduates who are questioned in traffic court
anywhere in Oregon and testify under oath that they
were taught at Academy that everybody has to have a
license to use the Public Right of Way, will be the two
witnesses required to convict you for treason (ORS
166.005(2)). Upon conviction you will be sentenced to
life imprisonment (ORS 166.005(3)). I will provide
evidence of your culpable mental state by testifying that
I sent you this request for assistance in investigating the
source of a rumor.

You should also consider the crimes listed below.

Official misconduct in the first degree, ORS
162.415, committed when an officer acts contrary to the
prohibition at ORS 181.400.

Simulating legal process, ORS 162.355, committed
by officers every time they issue a trafficking summons
and complaint to someone they have no reason to believe
is “... any employee, agent or representative of a firm,
corporation or other organization...”.

Falsely certifying under ORS 153.990, for asserting
that grounds exist to issue a citation to a member of the
general public (Note, plates on a vehicle ONLY establish
a presumption that it is involved in commercial activity.
When an officer stops someone and observes no evidence
of the regulated activity of hauling for hire, but issues
the ticket anyway, that's the crime.)

Perjury, ORS 162.065, falsely swearing to support
the constitutions upon assuming the duties of a law
enforcement officer.

Theft by extortion under ORS 164.075(h), using
pretense of office to take money or other property from
the people as punishment for exercise of right to use the
highway.

Conspiracy, ORS 161.450, planning, agreeing,
encouraging fellow law enforcement officers to impose
trafficking regulations against the general public.
Coordinating with certain elements within ODOT and
DMV and trafficking court administrative hearings
officers.

Solicitation, ORS 161.435, sending documents of
summons and complaint to trafficking court venues with
expectation of obtaining cooperation in the crime of
theft by extortion.

Even if you hadn't received this, “Officers are
presumed to know the law”.

Requests for Public Records become Public
Records.

Sincerely,

Richard L. Koenig
P.O. Box 5755
Portland, Oregon [97228]
Please honor the jurisdiction in which I choose to live,
thanks.

Cc; Ted Kulongoski
Paul De Muniz
John Kroger
Matt Garrett
Members of
Committee for Appropriate Enforcement of Motor
Vehicle Laws

NOTICE to agent is NOTICE to principal,
NOTICE to principal is NOTICE to agent.

Page 13 of 13
FYI Eric

To: Portland’s Police Chief, Rosie Sizer

From: K T, Poet

Dear Portland Police Chief, Rosie Sizer:

My name is KT, I am a poet, a single mother, and a
PCC student, I am also black. I am not as mobile as I
need to be. I may get a car. I am afraid of Portland
Police Bureau members. Because of this fear, I have
been considering applying for a driver license.

I know that Oregon ONLY issues three Classes of
Commercial driver licenses (see the DMV “Operator’s
Manual” under 1.1 and Oregon Revised Statutes,
“ORS” 807.031). I know that many police somehow
believe that everybody has to have permission from the
state in order to exercise the public’s right to use the
highway for vehicular travel (ORS 801.305, former
ORS 482.010(5), the intent of the legislature was “not to
change the law with [the current] revision” of vehicle
code, see Laws of Oregon 1983, Chapter 338, Section 3).

I have been informed by the Division of Driver and
Motor Vehicle Services that the Portland Police Bureau
received Notice of Proposed Rule Making and Statement
of Need and Fiscal Impact associated with an Oregon
Administrative Rule that, as of February 16th, 2005,
provides authority to the DMV to “optionally title” and
then “optionally register” vehicles if an owner, member
of the general public, chooses to apply, OAR 735-022-
0120. Portland’s Transportation Department,
Department of General Services and Office of Risk
Management also received the notice.

I know that under the rule’s authorizing statute at
ORS 803.040, “If this state has issued title for a vehicle,
the vehicle shall remain titled and subject to all of the
provisions of the vehicle code”. Perhaps this means that
the owner also becomes subject to a requirement of
driver licensing, but logically is would not, as the single
subject of chapter 803 is about titling of vehicles, and
beginning at 803.300 vehicle registration, NOT licensing
drivers (Art. I, Sec.1, Oregon Const). The driver
licensing chapter of the vehicle code clearly states that a
person who operates a vehicle on the highways open to
the public better have an appropriate driving privilege
(ORS 807.010). Nowhere in the driver licensing chapter
can any unconstitutional language be found purporting
to describe a license or require one for the general
public to merely travel in their personal use vehicles.
The single subject of chapter 807 is commercial driver
licenses allowing a “person” to “operate the motor
vehicles” which must be titled under ORS 803.030(14)(c
) and registered under ORS 803.305(14)(c ), “a vehicle
operated over the highways of this state for
compensation or profit must comply with the titling
[and] registration requirement[s]”.

I currently have no plans to “operate” or to “drive”
a motor vehicle which must comply with the titling
requirement. However, I am writing to advise you that
I will be “USING” my “solely for personal use” vehicle
(ORS 801.208(2)(e)) just like 2007’s House Bill 3445
says I have a right to. You are being given NOTICE in
order to assure that my right to use the streets of
Portland (see Kalich v Knapp, 72 Or 558), is not
interfered with by members of your Bureau (Notice to
the principle is notice to the agent) during a pretext
traffic stop (ORS 153.039(2)).

In the event that you do not intend to honor the
people’s protected right to travel in and through the
states, your fiduciary duty, imposed under the mandate
of government found in Article I, Section 1 of the
Oregon Constitution, requires that you inform me of
exactly what sanctions you and yours may impose upon
me for exercise of right described, not granted, under
ORS 801.305. You shall place your proposed sanction
to me at my address as appears below in ten days, or
you will convey to me that you and yours intend me no
harm, and honor my constitutionally protected and
statutorily described right.

For your convenience you will find enclosed:
Notice of Proposed Rule Making and
Statement of Need and Fiscal Impact for the Optional
Titling Rule;
The Certificate of Final Rule Adoption and Filing;
The ODOT mailing list, indicating PPB receipt of such
Notice, Statement and Certificate; House Bill 3445 of
2007

Sincerely,

KR

cc;
Portland City Risk Management
Police Commissioner Tom Potter
Commissioner Sam Adams for PDOT
The Ombudsman’s Office